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Justice Clark, the Voice of the Past, and the 
Exclusionary Rule 
Paul R. Baier* 
Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the 
F_ourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the 
�1ght to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers 
1�, therefore, �onstitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that 
nght to remam an empty promise. 
-Justice Tom Clark, Mapp v. Ohio.** 
The voice of the past, we are told, matters to the present. "History 
can help people see how they stand, and where they should go."' 
Shortly before he died, Justice Tom Clark met with my Supreme 
Court seminar students in the East Conference Room of the Supreme 
Court. We were a small seminar-the Justice and a busload of young 
people, with their teacher, on a field trip to the Court. When asked what 
was the most difficult thing about being on the Supreme Court, Justice 
Clark told us, "Well, I suppose all the hullabaloo they make over you. "2 
The conversation turned to Mapp v. Ohio, to the exclusionary rule, 
* Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University; Judicial Fellow, 
United States Supreme Court, 1975-76. I should like to thank Yale Kamisar for suggesting that I 
make Justice Clark's comments on Mapp v. Ohio widely available to the community of constitutional 
scholars. 
** 367 U. S. 643, 6 60 (19 6 1), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949). Justice Clark 
advanced the thoughts of earlier Justices, including Justice Joseph Bradley, in Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886): "[C]onstitutional provisions for the security of person and property 
should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, 
and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance." 
Similarly, Justice Holmes had written in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 
385, 391-92 (1920): 
The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is that although of course its 
seizure was an outrage which the Government now regrets, it may study the papers before 
it returns them, copy them, and then may use the knowledge that it has gained . . . . In our 
opinion such is not the law. It reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words. 
And Chief Justice Hughes, in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 722 (1931), wrote that if prior 
restraint of publication were permitted, "the constitutional protection [ofliberty of the press] would 
be reduced to a mere form of words." 
I. P. THOMPSON, THE VOICE OF THE PAST, ORAL HISTORY 225-26 (1978): 
[T]he real justification of history is not in giving an !mmortality to a f �w of the old. It is 
part of the way in which the living understand their place and part m the world . . -
, 
. 
[H]istory can help people to see how they stand, and w�ere they sh?uld go. . . . And m 
giving a past, it also helps them towards a future of their own makmg. . 2. Interview with Tom C. Clark, Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Umted 
States, in Washington, D.C. (May 3, 1977) (recorded with the permission �f Justice C:lark) �hereinaf­
ter cited as Interview]. All quotations in text are from the sound recordmg of the mterv1ew. 
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and to the role of judicial heroes in giving shape to our law. "I don't 
know about Mapp being my most important opinion, the one I'm most 
proud of. I am proud of it, because the idea of Mapp just shocked me."3 
Justice Clark explained why: 
When I was a kid I came out of the University of Texas Law 
School.[4] I went back to Dallas and tried to practice a little law 
and picked up a few cases and one of them was our cook's. We 
had a cook-believe it or not-for seven dollars a week. We paid 
her a dollar a day. That was the going wage for cooks. Her son 
was a nice little fellow but got into trouble. They found a half-pint 
of corn whiskey, during prohibition, in his house he had on Elm 
Street. And they cut open the mattress; they didn't have a search 
warrant or anything; they just took a knife and cut the mattresses 
open, took crow bars and pulled the baseboards away from the 
wall-just a terrible thing for these police officers to do. Then they 
carried the half-a-pint on a "silver platter," as they called it, over 
to the federal court, not to the state court, or the city court, but to 
the federal court. 
And so I filed a motion to quash. And Judge Atwell,[5] who 
was the judge, said, "Aren't you familiar with such-and-such 
case?" And I said "No." He said, "Well, that's one of my cases. 
Mr. Clerk, take Mr. Clark back there in my chambers and show 
him Atwell No. 7." I found out he had bound his opinions in 
Atwell 1, Atwell 2, Atwell 3 [laughing]-just like the U.S. 
Supreme Court does. And there was an opinion that said the fed­
eral courts would receive the proceeds of an illegal search which 
was made by state officers or city officers, because the federals had 
no control over those officers, and it would be an untoward thing 
for a person to go free just because of some technicality.[6] [Thus,] 
3. Justice C lark's reaction was not initially shared by all members of the Court. As Justice 
Potter Stewart has written: 
_I was shocke? when Justice Clark's proposed Court opinion reached my desk. I im­
!11ediat�ly wrote him a .
not� expressing m y  surprise and questioning the wisdom of overrul­
mg an important doctrme m a case in which the issue was not briefed, argued, or discussed 
by the state courts, by the parties' counsel, or at our conference following the oral 
argument. 
S�ewart, The Road to Mapp v. ?hio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclu­
si?nary ��le Ill Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (1983). Justice Stewart 
did not JOtn the Mapp opinion because of its activist approach in deciding an issue not before the 
C?urt. Ye�r.s la!er, _
however, he acknowledged that it is "perhaps the most important search-and· seizure dec1s10n m history " 'd d d " · · · · · . , 1 · • an agree with its conclus10n that the exclusionary rule 1s neces· sary to keep the nght of pr' . d b · · t . , ,, ivacy secure y the fourth amendment from 'remam[mg] an emp Y promise. Id. at 1389 (emphasis in original). 
D 11 
4·c!'L.B., 1922; admitted to Texas and Texas Supreme Court bars 1922· District Attorney, 
S�t 
as
s 
unty, T
C
exas, 1927-32; Attorney General, United States 1945-49·
' 
Asso�iate Justice, United es upreme ourt 1949 67 Di d J 13 197 
' ' FED 
ERAL JUDICIARY 50 d976). 
- . e une , 7. BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE • 
5. William Hawley At II U · d s · · II died December 22 196 1 
fi we , mte tates Dtstnct Court, N.D. Tex., 1924-61. Judge Atwe 
6 See 
' ' our mo_nths before Mapp v. Ohio was decided. 
· ' e.g., In re Guzzard1, 84 F. Supp. 294, 295 (N.D. Tex. 1949) (Atwell, CJ.) ("Any 
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Justice Tom C. Clark 
th� Silver Pl':ltter Doctrine-the idea being that the waiter carries 
thmgs on a �ilver platte.
r from the kitchen to the dining room, and 
so you earned this whiskey on a "silver platter" from the police 
department over to the federal court. Potter Stewart knocked that 
down in that case(7] just before Mapp. s
Young lawyer Clark's experience with blatant violations such as this 
makes Justice Clark's later concern with strong fourth amendment pro­
tection easy to understand. 
It has been said by one who knew him well that Tom Clark "be­
lieved in personal growth. There was a determination to grow."9 On the 
elevator at the Court, after discussing the Mapp case at conference, Tom 
Clark turned to Hugo Black and William Brennan and asked, 
"[W]ouldn't this be a good case to apply the exclusionary rule and· do 
what Wolf didn't do?" 10 
The answer, of course, was in the affirmative. Justice Clark's 
landmark opinion in Mapp v. Ohio infused the fourth amendment with 
the powerful remedy of  the exclusionary rule and extended the Weeks 
rule11 to the states. Justice Clark's personal papers, including the Mapp 
files, 12 shed new light on the judicial evolution culminating in Mapp v. 
Ohio. They show him to be a keen student of the fourth amendment. 
Detailed memoranda, written in longhand, reflect Tom Clark's determi­
nation to reach an informed decision, in large part through his own re­
search. Seventeen pages of handwritten notes13 evidence his difficult 
judicial task: first to  understand, then to judge "the competing interests 
of the social need that crime be repressed ... against the ignoble example 
of police lawlessly invading the security of the privacy of the people, in 
utter defiance of a constitutional mandate 'second to none in the Bill of 
evidence secured through unlawful search and seizure by state officers not acting directly, or indi· 
rectly, in behalf of the United States is admissible in a prosecution in the national courts."); accord 
W. ATWELL, ATWELL'S FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE WITH PRACTICE HELPS 30 
(5th ed. 1943) ("The Federal Government could use evidence secured by state officers on invalid 
search if the Federal officers had no part in the search."). 
7. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
8. Interview, supra note 2 (footnotes supplied). 
9. R. Clark, Remarks at the Opening of the Tom C. Clark Papers, University of Texas School 
of Law (March 19, 1985). 
10. B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 393 (1983). 
11. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (applying exclusionary rule to federal courts 
and officers). 
· 
12. The Tom C. Clark Papers were opened to the public on March 19, 19�5, at p�oce�dmgs 
held at the University of Texas School of Law. The Papers are housed_ 
in the S!'ectal Archives m the 
Tarlton Law Library at the University of Texas School of Law [hereinafter c1_
ted as Archive�]. 
13. Archives, supra note 12, Mapp case file, Box A l  15, _
Folder No. 7. �his folder contains the 
first handwritten draft of the opening pages of the Mapp op1mon and two detailed_ 
memoranda which 
trace the origin and development of the exclusionary rule _
in Suprem� �ourt �ec1s1ons. These _
n
_
otes 
reveal the working techniques of Tom Clark and are a window to hts mqumng mmd and spmt. 
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Rights.' "14 
In these hand-penned notes, Justice Clark asks himself a question, as 
though back in law school: "If S(upreme] C[ourt] in 1st establishing ex­
clusion rule was correct in saying 'the protection of the 4th Amend. is of 
no value and might as well be stricken from the constitution['] are we not 
forced to conclude that except to some the Amend[ment] is of little prac­
tical use[?]"l5 Logic compelled Clark to decide Mapp otherwise. Indeed, 
common sense was Tom Clark's hallmark; as he wrote, "There is no war 
between the Constitution and common sense."16 The guarantees of the 
fourth amendment clearly required corresponding procedural protection 
and judicial redress. Common sense dictated that "unless the require­
ments in this field are merely precatory,"17-and they certainly were 
not-the available "empty remedies"18 were intolerable. Thus Justice 
Clark blended research and logical reflection to craft the majority opin­
ion in Mapp v. Ohio and to effect a vindication of the promise of the 
fourth amendment. 
As majestic a decision as Mapp once might have been, the judicial 
evolution of which it is a part has n ot ceased. Only last term, six Justices 
14. The quotation is from the first handwritten draft of the Mapp opinion. Id., Draft of Opin­
ion, at 4 (handwritten draft), citing Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947). 
15. Archives, supra note 12, Mapp case file, Box Al15, Folder No. 7, Draft of Opinion, at 4 
(handwritten draft). 
16. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657. 
17. Archives, supra note 12, Mapp case file, Box Al 15, Folder No. 7, Draft of Opinion, at S 
(handwritten draft). 
18. The expression "empty remedies" twice appears in the first draft of the Mapp opinion. The 
term refers to Justice Clark's appraisal of "the other means of protection one i s  afforded by legal 
actions when his privacy is unlawfully invaded," listing these as "trespass, damages, protest to offi­
cials, resisting force with force, prosecution in some states, etc." At first, Justice Clark summarily 
dismissed these actions, w riting of them: "Admittedly, however, these are but empty remedies." He 
crossed out this sentence and substituted: "Our experience, however, shows these to be empty reme­
dies." Justice Clark then added, "Moreover, they stand in marked contrast t o  those afforded in the 
protection of other rights 'basic to a free society' [Wolf v .  Colorado, 338 U. S. a t  27] such as coerced 
confessions, free speech and press and religious liberty. It would hardly be fair to so discriminate in 
the protection of constitutional rights." Archives, supra note 12, Mapp case file, Box Al 15. In con­
trast, the final version reads: 
[T]he admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate 
de�ial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence 
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold 
otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. .. . 
Indeed, we are aware of no restraint, similar to that rejected today, conditioning the 
enforcement of any other basic constitutional right. The right to privacy, n o  less important 
than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people, would stand in 
marked contrast to all other rights declared as "basic to a free society." Wolf v. Colorado, 
[338 U.S:l at 27. This Court has not hesitated to enforce as strictly against the States as it 
does a�amst the Fe�eral G�ver�ment the.
rights ?f free speech and of a free press, the rights to notice and to a fa1r,.pubhc tnal, mcludmg, as 1t does, the right not to be convicted by use of .a �?erced confession, however logically relevant it be, and without regard to its rehab1hty. 
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656. 
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voted to carve a "good faith" exception out of Mapp v. Ohio.19 I should 
have preferred to see the Supreme Court enforcing the Bill of Rights. 
Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Leon, speaks of "the teaching of 
those Justices who first formulated the exclusionary rule."20 Again my 
mind drifts back to what Tom Clark told my students. I treasure the 
voice of that humble Texan's teaching: 
I couldn't understand why Wolf v. Colorado said that the 
fourth amendment applied to the states, but it just didn't seem to 
go all the way-in fact it was just an empty gesture, sort of like 
what Chief Justice Hughes used to say: No use to have a Constitu­
tion-it's pretty, got all sorts of nice fringes around it, but it 
doesn't mean anything, just a piece of paper-unless you really live 
by it and enforce it. And so that's true with Mapp and the fourth 
amendment.21 
Insight into the background of the exclusionary rule is one of the 
treasures waiting to be uncovered in the recently opened Tom Clark 
archives at the University of Texas School of Law. Scholars, judges, and 
students will find his collection invaluable for understanding the judicial 
process. Through his archives, Tom Clark's voice speaks to us still of 
wisdom and common sense in the administration of justice. 
19. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 
(1984). But see Justice Clark's explanation of his Mapp opinion, responding to Justice Harlan's 
criticism: 
There is, of course, as in all controversial cases, ground for disagreement. I have a court 
and therefore my theory at least has support. . . .  [I]f the right to privacy is really so basic 
as to be constitutional in rank and if it is really to be enforceable against the states (Wolf), 
then we cannot carve out of the bowels [of] that right the vital part, the stuff that gives it 
substance, the exclusion of evidence. 
Archives, supra note 12, Letter from Tom Clark to John Harlan (May 4, 1961), reprinted in part in B. 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 397. 
20. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3433 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan concludes his dissent by 
saying: "There is hope, however, that in time this or some later Court will restore these precious 
freedoms to their rightful place as a primary protection for our citizens against overreaching official­
dom." Id. at 3446. Twenty years earlier, when Mapp was first decided, Justice Brennan's initial 
reaction was buoyant: "Of course you know I think this is just magnificent and wonderful. I have 
not joined anything since I came with greater pleasure." Archives, supra note 12, Letter from Wil­
liam Brennan to Tom Clark (May 1, 1961), reprinted in B. ScHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 395. 
Justice Stevens' separate dissenting opinion in Leon also echoes earlier teaching: 
Nor should we so easily concede the existence of a constitutional violation for which there 
is no remedy. To do so is to convert a bill of Rights into an unenforced honor code that the 
police may follow in their discretion. The Constitution requires more; it requires a remedy. 
If the Court's new rule is to be followed, the Bill of Rights should be renamed. 
Id. at 3456-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). 
21. Interview, supra note 2. 
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